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tract for services. In each case where the warranty was extended into a new
area the court first determined that the consumer was at a disadvantage for he
lacked the knowledge to make his own determinations. The courts then considered the burden that the liability would place on the supplier. If this burden
was similar to that placed on a vendor then liability was imposed. Another
consideration has been whether the type of control the supplier of services had
over the results was similar to the control that the vendors and manufacturers
had over their goods. If the same type of factors are out of the control of both
then there should not be a distinction made between the types of transactions
involved.
The consumer of services has been ignored by those who have professed to
protect consumers. He is not as well protected by legislation as is the consumer
of goods and he is not as well protected with respect to the types of warranties
that the courts will impose. Legislation to protect the service consumer can be
directed at various goals. As in the proposed New York Mechanics Licensing
Acts, the legislation can be aimed at solving the safety problems alone or alternatively at the collective problems of safety, economic and quality protection.
Even without legislation, judicially imposed warranties need not be limited to
sales transactions but can be used in service transactions. Not only can the parts
be warranted but the services can be warranted as well. The protection offered
the consumer of services must equal those given to the goods consumer where
the needs and problems are the same.
ROBERT

M. F .ENsoN

DEMISE OF THE DOCTRINE OF CAPITAL WINE
AND SPIRIT V. POKRASS
INTRODUCTION

A stockholder's derivative action is a form of suit available to shareholders
to vindicate a corporate claim and thereby protect their interest in a corporation
when corporate management breaches its trust or is careless in managing the
business of a corporation.' When a corporation has an action against a party it
is management's duty to bring a direct action to recover the damages owed to
the corporation. However, if management refuses to bring suit, only then can a
stockholder bring a derivative action against management for these damages.
In Pollitz v. Gould2 such an action was brought by a stockholder of the
Wabash Railroad Company to set aside as fraudulent a transfer and exchange
of stock. The question presented to the Court of Appeals was whether a stock1.
2.

Chaplin v. Selznick, 186 Misc. 66, 58 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1945).
202 N.Y. 11, 94 N.E. 1088 (1911).

COMMENTS
holder may bring an action of this character for the purpose of avoiding an improper transaction consumated at the expense of the corporation before he acquired his stock. It is important to note that the question presented did not
involve any incidental considerations such as, the fact that the prior holder of
the stock consented to the transaction or the fact that plaintiff's subsequent
acquisitions of the stock were accompanied by any circumstances which would
render it inequitable for him to seek relief.
The court first established that a stockholder has an indivisible interest in
the property and assets of a corporation represented by certificates of stock,
and that this interest is transferred to the subsequent holder of these certificates
with their sale.8 They went on to say that it would seem to be clear that a right
of action by or in behalf of the corporation for fraud to set aside a conveyance
of its assets in which a stockholder has this indivisible interest is also transferrable with his certificates. 4 The court was unable to see any real or substantial
distinction by virtue of which a stockholder transferring his certificates would
transfer all of his indivisible interest in bonds or real estate on hand, but would
not transfer his interest in a right of action to recover bonds or real estate
which had been fraudulently withdrawn from the possession of the corporation. 5
If the subsequent holder by acquiring the certificate does acquire this latter
interest, it seems to follow that he may if necessary, on behalf of the corporation, assert or prosecute an action to protect and enforce this right of action.6
Pollitz v. Gould, therefore, established the rule that a stockholder transferring his stock in a corporation transfers all his rights in a corporation including
the right to bring a derivative action to enforce these rights. Between the time
Pollitz v. Gould was decided and the General Corporation Law was amended in
1943 a common practice had developed whereby individuals having found a corporation where mismanagement had occurred would purchase a minimal stock
interest in this company.7 Being stockholders of this corporation they would
then bring a derivative action to enforce the rights of the corporation against
its management. These same individuals aware that in most instances the cost
to management of defending the suit would far exceed any recoverable damages, would approach management to negotiate a settlement for not prosecuting. Damages recovered if a derivative action had been brought would have
been ratably distributed among all the stockholders. The proceeds from these secret
settlements were not. Furthermore, in many instances no real wrongs had been
committed by management yet these individuals were bought off in order to protect the corporation's good will. The dangers and inequities in such secret settlements are obvious. In an attempt to curb these strike suits, while at the same
time allowing stockholders with a legitimate claim to bring suit against manage3.

Id. at 15, 94 N.E. at 1091 (1911).

4. Id.
5. Id.
6.
7.

Id. at 16, 94 NE. at 1092 (1911).
I. Kantrowitz and S. Slutsky, White New York Corporations (1947) § 61, at 21.2.
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ment, the New York legislature enacted section 61 of the General Corporation
8
Law.
"Had the legislature really been concerned with the so-called abuses of
stockholder suits, the remedy was obvious: to bar 'secret settlements' ".9Instead, section 61 of the General Corporation Law, now section 626 of the Business Corporation Law enumerates a series of prerequisites that a stockholder
must fulfill before having standing to bring a derivative suit. One of these
requires that when a stockholder brings an action in the right of a corporation
it must appear that the plaintiff was a stockholder at the time of the transactions
of which he complains, or that his shares or his interest therein devolved upon
him by operation of law. 10 The purpose of this requirement was to prevent an
individual from buying into a large publicly held corporation solely for the purpose of bringing a derivative suit, while still allowing an injured stockholder who
owned stock at the time the wrong was committed to bring an action for the
benefit of the corporation.
CAPITAL WINE & SPIRIT CORPORATION V. POKRASS

In Capital Wine & Spirit Corporation v. Pokrass," a direct action was
brought by a corporation to recover from its former officers and directors for
misappropriation and waste of assets. Joseph Sachs, the corporation's sole stockholder at the time the action was brought, had acquired his interest in the corporation after the wrongs complained of occurred. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, held that the contemporaneous ownership
requirements of section 61 of the General Corporation Law [the predecessor
of section 626] 12 would have precluded Sachs from bringing a derivative action
to redress these wrongs and therefore he should not be allowed to recover under
the guise of a direct action what he would have been prevented from recovering
through a derivative action. To support their holding, the court cited Justice
Pound's opinion in Home Fire Insurance Company v. Barber,'3 where he stated
that "where all the present stockholders are so circumstanced that no relief
should be afforded them in a court of equity, the corporation may not recover
for their benefit."
In so deciding the Pokrass case the court did not properly interpret section
626 in light of its legislative purpose, nor did they make the distinction be8. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law, § 61 (McKinney 1943). Now, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 626(b)
(1963). Hereinafter referred to as section 626.

9. See Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 Col. L. Rev. 1

(1947). See N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. Rep. Leg. Doc. No. 65(j) (1942); N.Y. Law Rev.
Comm. Rep. Leg. Doc. No. 65(c) (1945).
10. § 626(b) (McKinney 1967).
11. 277 App. Div. 184, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1st Dept. 1950), aff'd 302 N.Y. 734, 98
N.E.2d 704, mot. den. 302 N.Y. 840, 100 N.E.2d 37 (1951). Hereinafter referred to as Pokrass.
12. Section 61 General Corporation Law (McKinney 1943).
13. 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024, 60 L.RA. 927, 108 Am. St. Rep. 716 (1903). Hereinafter referred to as Barber.
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tween an affirmative defense to a derivative action and a prerequisite that is
necessary to give plaintiff standing to bring this action.
Barber stated that when all the stockholders of a corporation are equitably
estopped from bringing a derivative suit that the corporation cannot recover for
their benefit through a direct suit. This, however, is true notwithstanding the
existence of section 626. Section 626 states what a plaintiff must -do to
have standing to bring a derivative suit. It has nothing to do with equitable
considerations. It merely lists requirements a plaintiff must fulfill. If a plaintiff is in fact equitably estopped, as it appears Sachs was in Pokrass, then the
case should be decided on these equitable grounds and not confused with section 626 considerations, particularly when the action involved is brought by
the corporation directly and not by a stockholder derivatively.
The facts in Pokrass show that Sachs was equitably estopped from bringing a derivative action for he knew the true value of the company's assets when
he purchased its stock. Since Sachs had acquired his interest after the wrongs
complained of occurred he also could not fulfill the contemporaneous ownership
requirements of section 626 and was therefore statutorily precluded from
bringing a derivative suit. In deciding Pokrass, the court failed to make the distinction between being equitably estopped and being statutorily precluded from
bringing suit. The court reasoned that Sachs did not own his stock at the time
the wrongs complained of occurred and therefore could not fulfill the contemporaneous ownership requirements of section 626. Since Sachs was the sole
stockholder, there were no other stockholders who could bring suit. The court
then concluded that since there were no stockholders who could bring suit, it
would be inequitable to allow the corporation to sue directly for the benefits of
the suit would go to the same stockholder who could not sue derivatively. To
support this position, the court cited Barber.
In fact, the rationale of Barber does not apply for Barber dealt with equitable considerations and not statutory requirements such as those of section
626. If the court had said that since Sachs was equitably estopped from
bringing a derivative suit and that since there were no other stockholders who
could bring suit that it would be inequitable for the corporation to recover
directly (for the benefits of the suit would go to one who is equitably estopped
from bringing suit), then the case would have been properly decided.
The following example should show why this distinction between an equitable estoppel to a cause of action and a statutory preclusion from bringing a
cause of action is so important:
Assume, for instance, that a director of a closely held corporation
wastes assets. The stock is then sold to a single buyer, who upon discovering the misdeeds, finds that he has not received fair value for the
purchase price. The buyer cannot sue the sellers since they did not
commit any fraud; he has no direct action against the guilty party
since a suit for mismanagement must be brought by or in the name of
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the corporation 3 Fletcher, Corporations § 1282 (1947); he cannot
bring a derivative action because of § 61; and under the Pokrass
decision the corporation itself cannot sue. Thus although a clear case
grounds is established, the buyer must placfor recovery on equitable
14
idly accept his loss.
If Pokrass had been properly decided, that is, solely on equitable considerations, this result could not occur and the corporate plaintiff having established
a valid cause of action would be permitted to recover.
Although the court in Pokrass did nQt make the necessary distinction
between an equitable estoppel to a cause of action and a statutory prerequisite
to bringing a cause of action they did prevent Sachs from what appears to be an
inequitable recovery. The problem caused by Pokrass arises when it is cited as
authority in a decision where there are no equitable considerations present that
might otherwise preclude a plaintiff from recovering. By using the Pokrass
rationale in deciding an action brought directly by the corporation where but
for the contemporaneous ownership requirements the plaintiff could bring suit,
the court effectively precludes recovery in situations where section 626 has no
application. In the words of Justice Shientag, dissenting in Pokrass,
Section 61 of the General Corporation Law [section 626] applies only
to a derivative stockholder's suit and not to a suit brought by a corporation on its own behalf. This is true notwithstanding the fact that
one stockholder owns the entire capital stock which he purchased
after the commission of the wrongful acts complained of."r
DEVELOPMENT AND DEMISE OF THE

PoYRAss

DOCTRINE

It took the New York courts over a decade to ultimately reach Justice
Shientag's conclusion. The following cases while not exhaustive, exemplify the
development of the court's reasoning in finally coming to his conclusion.
The first case to be decided on the authority of Pokrass was Diamond v.
Diamond.'6 Plaintiff, having received her 50% stock interest in closely held
corporation from her husband's estate, brought a derivative action against the
owner-director of the other 50% to have restored to the corporation money
which had been diverted by the concerted effort of plaintiff's husband and the
defendant director. The evidence established that the diversion had been with
the full knowledge of plaintiff, that she had relied on the acts done by her
husband as her agent, that she had participated in the acts complained of and
that she had benefited thereby. 17 The court held that plaintiff was not entitled
to recover again through the subterfuge of a derivative action, amounts which
had been diverted with her participation. 18 To support this holding the court
14. Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 345 (1951).
15. 277 App. Div. 184, 190, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291, 297 (1st Dept. 1990).
16. 200 Misc. 1055, 107 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Part VI 1951). Hereinafter referred to as Diamond.
17. Id. at 1057-68, 107 N.Y.S.2d at 511-520.
18. Id. at 1070, 107 N.YS.2d at 521.
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relied on the Pokrass case as supporting the Barber doctrine which in turn
precluded recovery on equitable grounds.' 9 It is not readily ascertainable why
the Pokrass case, which involved a direct suit, was used to decide the Diamond
case, which was a derivative action.
Because Diamond was decided so soon after Pokrass and because Diamond
relied so heavily on Pokrass to support its holding, subsequent decisions by the
New York courts usually cited both cases simultaneously for the holding that
a suit cannot be brought by a corporation for the benefit of its stockholders
when such stockholders would be estopped from instituting suit themselves in
the corporation's behalf. This multiple citation as authority for the same rule
of law has thoroughly confused the law in this area since Pokrass involved a
direct action by a corporation where the plaintiff was statutorily estopped and
Diamond involved a derivative suit where the plaintiff was equitably estopped.
The case most vividly showing the inequities in the Pokrass rationale is
Ford Tank Maintenance v. Ford.20 The sole stockholder in a corporation purchased his interest on July 1, 1959. Subsequently, it was discovered that the
former officers and directors had unlawfully withdrawn assets from the corporation. Because the purchaser did not own his stock when the wrongs complained
of occurred, section 626 precluded him from suing derivatively. A direct
action was therefore brought by the corporation in its own name to recover the
assets allegedly withdrawn.
In denying recovery, the court stated that since the sole stockholder could
not sue derivatively the corporation could not sue directly for the benefit of the
suit would inure to the identical plaintiff who was barred from recovering
derivatively. 21 To support this position the court cited Pokrass.22
The court did note that if there was fraud with respect to the sale of23 the
corporation that the stockholder could collect directly in a fraud action. If
fraud could be proven, recourse would be available to the stockholder. The
difficulty with this decision, which is based on Pokrass, is twofold. First of all,.
fraud, if it did occur, is difficult to prove. More important, however, is the
problem raised when fraud has not occurred.
By saying that a plaintiff can only recover if actionable fraud has been
committed, is to open the door to transactions where something less than actionable fraud is committed and then the corporation is sold to an unsuspecting
buyer. The buyer has no recourse through a derivative action because of the contemporaneous ownership requirements of section 626 likewise he has no recourse through a direct action because of Pokrassand now Ford; and because no
actionable fraud has been committed he has no recourse through a fraud action.
19. Id. at 1071, 107 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
20. 24 Misc. 2d. 261, 203 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. Sp. Tm. N.Y. County Part I 1960)'
Hereinafter cited Ford.
21. Id. at 489, 490, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
22.

Id.

23. Id.
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Therefore, although an unsuspecting buyer has been injured, he is left without
recourse.
As previously stated, most of the difficulty in this area of the law occurred
because the court in Pokrass did not make the necessary distinction between
equitable estoppel and statutory estoppel. If they had, they could not have
applied the rationale of the Barber decision to section 626. In 1964, in a
decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the Appellate Division finally made
this necessary distinction and has hopefully eliminated the problems caused by
Pokrass.
Plattv. Platt24 involved an action by a corporation against its former officers
and directors for alleged wrongful acts, for derelictions in duties and for damages
thereby sustained. At the time of the commencement of the action there were
pending plans for the merger of the plaintiff corporation. To insure that the
stockholders would not lose their cause of action because of the merger, the class
A stockholders had the following incorporated into the merger agreement:
(4) The proceeds of any action at law or equity brought by or on
behalf of the corporation now known as The Platt Corporation shall
be distributed among the Class A Common stockholders as of record
date . . . . The surviving corporation shall bear the expense of said
actions against former officers and directors ... but all attorneys fees
shall be paid out of the proceeds.
The defendants urged that the consummation of the merger had disabled
plaintiff from continuing with the maintenance of the action "not because of
the effect of the consolidation on the corporation's rights, but because plaintiff's
stockholders disposed of the stock in the consolidation." 2 5 Defendants therefore
moved to dismiss the action under section 626 on the ground that plaintiff
did not have capacity to sue. The defendants did not challenge the sufficiency
of plaintiff's allegations, but contended that the efficacy of the cause of action
has been destroyed by the disposition of the stock of plaintiff's stockholders in
connection with its merger into the other corporation. It was not disputed by
the defendants, that, but for the merger consummated subsequent to the commencement of the action, the plaintiff would have been able to maintain this
action on the basis of the allegations of the complaint. The court said that
nothing is lost by a merger of corporations, and that any right which lawfully
belonged to the merged corporation can be asserted by the possessor corporation, unless bound by the contemporaneous ownership provisions of section 626.
It was upon these provisions that defendant relied, stating that the cause of
action to recover for the alleged wrongs to the plaintiff no longer exists because
plaintiff presently has no stockholder who held stock at the time of the alleged
wrongful acts and who could maintain a derivative action to recover for such
wrongs. In support of their position defendants argue that the effect of the
24.
25.

21 A.D.2d 116, 249 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1st Dept. 1964). Hereinafter referred to as Platt.
Id. at 120, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
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merger agreement was to transfer all of plaintiff's issued and outstanding stock
to the successor corporation after the commission of the alleged wrongs. Inasmuch as the surviving corporation would be precluded from maintaining a
stockholder derivative action because of the contemporaneous ownership provisions, the plaintiff may not now continue with the action.
In answering defendant's contention, the court made the distinction between an equitable estoppel and a statutory requirement which is a condition
precedent to suit. They stated that, where causes of action against directors
and officers for breach of contract or fiduciary duties are sought to be enforced
by the corporation directly, that such causes of action exist independently of
the provisions of section 626 and are not automatically or necessarily to be
controlled by the limitations therein with respect to the maintenance of derivative actions. 26 Furthermore, while in a particular case, policy or equitable considerations may require that the rights of the corporation be equated with the
rights of its stockholders and subject to the same statutory limitations, absent
such considerations, the cases are to be treated no differently than any ordinary
action to recover damages for injury to the assets or properties of the corpora27

tion.

In essence the court has now adopted Justice Shientag's position that
section 626 has nothing to do with actions brought directly by a corporation.
Unfortunately the court continued by saying that, if equitable considerations
so require, section 626 can be used as a bar to preclude recovery.28 While
the court properly distinguished between an equitable and a statutory estoppel,
they went too far by saying that section 626 might be used as an equitable
bar to preclude recovery. Section 626 has nothing to do with equitable considerations. As previously discussed this section was enacted to prevent strike
suits and secret settlements. If recovery would be inequitable there are sufficient
equitable defenses available, such as estoppel, which would preclude this result.
Using this section to prevent an equitable recovery can only continue to cause
problems like those raised by Pokrass.
CONCLUSION

While it does not appear that Platt has overruled Pokrass, it does seem to
have sufficiently limited its holding so that if a case like Ford were to be
decided today, the contemporaneous ownership requirement of section 626
would not be used to bar the corporation from recovering.
Although other jurisdictions have contemporaneous ownership statutes
similar to New York's2 9 no cases in these jurisdictions have been found that
26. Id.
27. Id. at 122, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
28. Id. at 124, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
29. See e.g. Del. Corp. Law § 327, Laws of NJ. Tit. 14, c. 3 §§ 15, 16, Calif. Gen.
Corp. Law § 834.
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come to the conclusion of Pokrass. Pennsylvania's contemporaneous ownership
statute"0 has an interesting additional feature that allows a plaintiff, in the
discretion of the court, to maintain his suit even though he did not own his
stock at the time the wrongs complained of occurred, where, but for this requirement he could establish a valid cause of action and that if he is not
allowed to bring suit serious injustice will result.
What Pennsylvania's statute has in effect done is ratify the public policy
against the purchasing of law suits by requiring the shareholder bringing suit
to have owned his stock at the time the wrong complained of occurred. However, the Pennsylvania legislature has recognized that this requirement should
not be applied mechanically; that in a given situation a stockholder may not
have intentionally purchased a law suit but in fact may have been injured, and
that but for this ownership requirement he could establish a valid cause of
action. In such instances, the court will allow a shareholder to maintain his
suit even though he did not own his stock at the time the wrongs complained of
occurred. This situation, however, is not to be confused with what happened in
New York where equitable considerations were used to bar recovery. Here
equitable factors are being considered to allow recovery. It would seem that if
the New York legislature were to include such a provision in its contemporaneous ownership statute further inequitable decision such as Ford might be
avoided.
RONALD J. AMXELROD
30.

Pa. Bus. Corp. Law § 516 (Pa. Stat. Anno. 1966):

SUIT BY SHAREHOLDERS TO ENFORCE A SECONDARY RIGHT. In

any suit brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more shareholders against any officer, or director, or former officer or director of a corporation
. . . because such corporation refuses to enforce rights which may properly be
asserted by it, the plaintiff or plaintiffs must aver and it must be made to appear,
that the plaintiff . . . was a shareholder . . . at the time of the transaction of
which he complains, or that his shares . . . devolve upon him by operation of law
from a person who was a shareholder . . . at such time: Provided, however, that
any shareholder . . . who except for this section would be entitled to maintain

such a suit and who does not meet such requirements, may, nevertheless, in the
discretion of the court, be allowed to maintain such suit on preliminary showing
to the court . . . that there is a strong prima fade case in favor of the clah
asserted on behalf of the corporation and that without such suit serious injustice
will result. [emphasis added].

